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Abstract 
Purpose – Education as a weapon in the fight against conflict and violence remains widely 
debated in policy and academic circles. Against the background of growing political instability in 
Africa and the central role of the knowledge economy in 21
st
 century development, this paper 
provides three contributions to existing literature. It assesses how political stability/ non-violence 
is linked to the incremental, synergy and lifelong learning effects of education. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – We define lifelong learning as the combined knowledge 
acquired during primary, secondary and tertiary education. Principal component analysis is used 
to reduce the dimensions of educational and political indicators. An endogeneity robust dynamic 
system Generalized Methods of Moments is used for the estimations.  
 
Findings – We establish three main findings. First, education is a useful weapon in the fight 
against political instability. Second, there is an incremental effect of education in the transition 
from secondary to tertiary schools. Third, lifelong learning also has positive and synergy effects. 
This means that the impact of lifelong learning is higher than the combined independent effects 
of various educational levels. The empirical evidence is based on 53 African countries for the 
period 1996-2010. 
 
Practical implications – A plethora of policy implications are discussed, inter alia: how the drive 
towards increasing the knowledge economy through lifelong learning can be an effective tool in 
the fight against violence and political insurgency in Africa.  
 
Originality/value – As the continent is nursing knowledge economy ambitions, the paper is 
original in investigating the determinants of political stability/non violence from three dimensions 
of education attainment: the incremental, the lifelong learning and a synergy effect.  
 
JEL Classification: I20; I28; K42; O10; O55 
Keywords: Lifelong learning; Stability; Development; Africa 
 
3 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Arab Spring is being prolonged as many of the countries involved are now only 
seeing small reflections of light at the end of the tunnel. First, the conception and definition of 
democracy has been revised several times in Egypt as investor confidence erodes and the country 
faces economic challenges of critical dimensions. Second, the democratic transition in Tunisia 
has not yet produced the desired results because political assassinations and incidences of social 
disorder are substantially curtailing economic activity. Third, the lawlessness in the post-Gaddafi 
era of Libya has intensified because the rebels are neither willing to disarm nor ready to succumb 
to the authority of the central government. Fourth, after the protracted ousting of President Ali 
Abdullah Saleh, Yemen is failing in its socio-political contract because the transition is being 
hampered by daunting economic challenges and regional insurgencies and last but not the least, 
Syria’s situation is one of humanitarian catastrophe because neither side of the conflict is winning 
nor willing to go to the negotiating table without preconditions (Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2014). 
 In sub-Saharan Africa, the situation of the 54
th
 and newest republic in the world (South 
Sudan) is increasingly dominated by rebels seizing oil fields and engaging in random murder. 
The situation is no better for neighbouring states which have been plagued by political unrest and 
civil strife in recent decades. For example, the Central African Republic has been confronted with 
a serious political impasse based along religious lines. Chad (2005-2010), Angola (1975-2002), 
the Central African Republic (the ripples of aborted coup d’états that occurred between 1996-
2003 and the Bush War of 2004-2007), Burundi (1993-2005), Congo Democratic Republic, 
Sierra Leone (1991-2002), Liberia (1999-2003), Somalia, Sudan and Côte d’Ivoire (a rekindled 
crisis in 2011 after the 2002-2007 civil war and the 1999 coup d’état) have all shown instances of 
such impasses. This is not to mention, among others: Zimbabwe’s politico-economic meltdown, 
the Kenyan post-election violence of 2007/2008 and the increasingly determined Boko Haram 
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insurgency in Nigeria. Besides, the brutal and lengthy civil wars in Chad, Somalia, Angola, 
Liberia, and Sierra Leone which have been very costly to African development; the carnage in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo and the genocide in Darfur-Sudan were registered as the 
world’s highest war causalities since World War II in their time. In a nutshell, seven out of nine 
recent cases of total societal chaos and breakdown into anarchy in the world have occurred in 
Africa. Accordingly, with the exceptions of Afghanistan and Syria, we have Burundi, Angola, 
Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Congo and Sudan as the most harmful in the world.  
 In the light of above stylized facts, greater political stability and the absence of violence 
are of considerable policy relevance. As the world is driving towards the knowledge economies 
(KE) that have become indispensible for prosperity in the 21
st
 century, it is interesting to assess 
how this paradigm shift might affect conflicts and political stability in the African Continent. KE 
and political stability are key components of African development. But unfortunately, along with 
the stylized facts on political strife in the first-two paragraphs here, the knowledge index of the 
Continent (which dropped between 2000 and 2009) has become considerably lower relative to 
other regions of the world (Anyanwu, 2009; Tchamyou, 2014). As far as we know the current 
extant of KE literature has not attempted to tackle the connection between lifelong learning and 
political stability/non-violence. The main issues considered by this KE literature have been,  
among other things: general opinions of KE (Lin, 2006; Makinda, 2007; Rooney, 2005; Aubert, 
2005), KE in space transformation (Moodley, 2003; Maswera et al., 2008), spatiality in the 
production of knowledge (Bidwell et al., 2011; Neimark, 2012), economic incentives and  
institutional regimes (Letiche, 2006; Cogburn, 2003; Saxegaard, 2006; Andrés and  Asongu, 
2013a; Nguena and  Tsafack, 2014), education (Kamara et al., 2007; Ford, 2007; Amavilah, 
2009; Weber, 2011; Wantchekon et al., 2014), information and  communication technologies 
(Jonathan and  Camilo, 2008; Maurer, 2008; Chavula, 2010; Ondiege, 2010; Merritt, 2010; Aker  
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and  Mbiti, 2010; Butcher, 2011; Thacker, and  Wright, 2012; Demonbynes and  Thegeya, 2012; 
Penard et al., 2012;  Asongu, 2015a, 2013a), intellectual capital and  economic development 
(Wagiciengo & Belal, 2012; Preece, 2013), innovation (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka  and Sampath, 2007; 
Carisle et al., 2013; Oluwatobi et al., 2014), research and  development (Sumberg, 2005; German 
and  Stroud, 2007), intellectual property rights (Lor  and  Britz, 2005; Zerbe, 2005; Myburgh, 
2011; Asongu, 2013b, 2015b; Andrés et al., 2014; Andrés  and  Asongu, 2013ab), KE oriented 
towards financial development (Asongu, 2013c, 2014a, 2015c), indigenous knowledge systems 
(Lwoga et al., 2010; Raseroka, 2008) and catch-up in KE in relation to the economics of East 
Asia (Lucas, 1988, 1993; Bezmen  and  Depken, 2004; Tchamyou, 2014; Kim et al., 2012; 
Andrés et al., 2014; Andrés and  Asongu, 2013ab; Asongu, 2013e). 
 The abundant literature on ‘conflict channels’ and ‘mechanisms of revolution’ can be 
classified into three main strands: channels to conflict, avenues along which resources may fuel 
conflicts and conflict resolution mechanisms. Humphreys (2005) has presented some interesting 
literature on the first-two strands. First, the process leading to conflicts, especially in natural 
resource abundant countries, involves greedy rebels and foreign parties, grievances, weak-state 
and sparse-network systems. Second, consistent with their narrative, there are also a plethora of 
avenues along which natural resources may influence the duration of  social disorder, inter alia: 
military balances, fragmented organizational structures, domestic and international conflict 
premia . The third strand consists mainly of traditional and modern systems of conflict resolution. 
These scenarios have culminated in a twofold international concern over  the urgent need to 
address political strife and violence in Africa, as well as the debilitating effect of issues on 
security, peace  and development as well as the burgeoning impact of terrorism and organized 
crime (Gastrow, 2001; UNODC, 2005ab; Moshi, 2007; Asongu and Kodila-Tedika, 2013ab).  
6 
 
 Arising from the above literature, this study will make a fourfold contribution. First, it 
deviates from existing models by focusing on education as a channel for conflict resolution. This 
is based on documented evidence on peace education (e.g., bilingualism helps in conflict 
resolution [Costa et al., 2008]). Second, it assesses if there is an incremental effect of education 
per se in conflict resolution. This is in response to a growing contradictory literature concerning 
education and political governance issues. In essence, drawing from exploratory studies (e.g., 
Heyneman, 2004, 2008b, Heyneman et al., 2007) on the high cost of bad governance structures, 
one strand supports the positive role of education in good political governance (Heyneman, 2002, 
2008a; Beets, 2005; Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2009), whereas another stream suggests that 
education fuels bad governance practices like corruption (Kaffenberger, 2012; Mocan, 2008; 
Truex, 2011). Third, the study also investigates whether or not there is a lifelong learning effect 
in conflict resolution. Interest in the third contribution arises from the growing relevance of KE in 
21
st
 century development. In the paper, we measure lifelong learning as the combined knowledge 
acquired during primary, secondary and tertiary school education. Fourth, the first-three 
contributions are complemented by an investigation of whether or not there is a ‘synergy or 
interactive effect’ from lifelong learning. Accordingly, this consists of examining if the favorable 
effect of lifelong learning on political stability and non-violence is higher than the combined 
independent effect of primary, secondary and tertiary educations. The paper also extends the  
evolving stream of literature on learning activities (Nyarko, 2013a) and lessons therefrom in 
achieving economic prosperity (Lee and  Kim, 2009; Lee, 2009; Wa Gĩthĩnji and  Adesida, 2011; 
Babatunde, 2012; Fosu, 2013a)
1
.  
                                                 
1
Based on past lessons (Fosu, 2010), Fosu (2012, 2013a) has recently documented the literature on strategies and 
lessons for achieving development success. The strategies are mostly drawn from: East Asia & the Pacific (Lee, 
2013; Warr, 2013;  Jomo & Wee, 2013; Thoburn, 2013; Khan, 2013); the emerging Asian giants of China & India 
(Yao, 2013; Singh, 2013; Santos-Paulino, 2013); Latin America & the Caribbean  (De Mello, 2013; Solimano, 2013; 
Pozo et al., 2013; Trejos, 2013; Cardoso, 2013);  the Middle East & North Africa (Looney, 2013; Nyarko, 2013b; 
7 
 
 Consistent with Akinwale (2010, p. 125), the theoretical underpinnings of the study are 
deeply rooted in the Thomas-Kilmann’s Model of Conflict Management and Black’s Social 
Control Theory. The latter has proposed the circumstances which predict the usage of one of the 
five ways of social control (avoidance, settlement, self-help, tolerance and negotiation) in the 
linkages among groups, organizations and individuals. The model of the former elucidates 
strategic intentions that could be centered on a two-factor matrix (cooperation and assertiveness) 
which, in collaboration, produced five conflict styles of management (competition, 
accommodation, avoidance, collaboration and compromise). The narrative of Akinwale is 
consistent with Volkema and Bergmann (1995), Black (1990), Borg (1992), and Thomas (1992). 
In addition, education is expected to theoretically improve political governance through the 
channels of social responsibility, improved social cohesion and compliance to the rule of law 
(Heyneman, 2002, 2008a; Beets, 2005; Oreopoulos & Salvanes, 2009). However, as we have 
highlighted above, there is another stream of the literature which sustains that education could be 
a source of bad governance practices (Kaffenberger, 2012; Mocan, 2008; Truex, 2011).  
 The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 covers data and methodology. 
Empirical analysis is discussed in Section 3 and Section 4 provides concluding remarks.  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
 
2.1 Data 
 
 We assess a sample of 53 African countries with data for the period 1996-2010 from the 
African Development Indicators of the World Bank. The choice of this periodicity is constrained 
by the political stability and/or non-violence indicators which are available only from the year 
                                                                                                                                                              
Baliamoune-Lutz, 2013; Drine, 2013) and; sub-Saharan Africa (Subramanian, 2013; Lundahl & Petersson, 2013; 
Robinson, 2013;  Fosu, 2013b; Naudé, 2013). 
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1996. The data consists of three-year averages presented in non-overlapping intervals (NOI)
2
 to: 
(1) mitigate  short-run or business cycle disturbances, (2) ensure that the basic condition for the 
Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) empirical strategy is met (N>T) and (3) reduce 
instrument proliferation or restrict over-identification. The main dependent variable is a measure 
of political stability/non-violence. This is complemented by political governance (political 
stability and voice and accountability) for robustness checks. The definition and measurement of 
political governance used for robustness checks is informed by Andrés et al. (2013).  The 
‘political governance’ and ‘lifelong learning’ variables are obtained from principal component 
analysis (PCA) as discussed below (see Sections 2.2.1 and 3.2).  
 We control for government expenditure, foreign aid, inflation, democracy, trade openness 
and per capita economic prosperity. While government expenditure is consistent with fiscal 
behavior in political governance (Eubank, 2012; Asongu and Jellal, 2013), foreign aid has been 
documented to negatively affect political stability in the African Continent (Eubank, 2012; 
Asongu, 2012a, 2013f). On inflation and democracy, whereas the former may worsen political 
governance (especially with soaring prices for basic items such as food), the latter is naturally a 
positive determinant of good governance. The expected signs of these control variables are 
broadly in accordance with macroeconomic and institutional characteristics leading to the 2011 
Arab Spring (Khandelwal & Roitman, 2012). Globalization in terms of trade openness improves 
stability of political systems with associated national income (Lalountas et al., 2011; Asongu, 
2014b). Income-levels are also instrumental in raising government quality (Asongu, 2012b, p. 
191). We also use time-effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity.  
 The variables are defined in Appendix 1, the summary statistics presented in Appendix 2 
and correlation analysis detailed in Appendix 3.  From the descriptive statistics, the variables are 
                                                 
2
 We have five-three year NOI: 1996-1998; 1999-2001; 2002-2004; 2005-2007 & 2008-2010.  
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comparable and we can be confident that some plausible estimated relationships will emerge 
from a regression analysis of their variations. Additionally, the use of simple pairwise correlation 
coefficients helps to mitigate the influence of misspecification error arising from 
overparameterization and multicollinearity.  
 
2.2 Methodology 
 
2.2.1 Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
 
 Since the phenomenon of lifelong learning is complex and multi-dimensional (Kirby et 
al., 2010) there is currently no mainstream consensus on the manner in which it should be 
measured. The difficulty in calibrating this phenomenon is compounded by the fact that it 
involves a learning process from birth to death.  In this paper we define lifelong learning as the 
formal educational process that entails primary, secondary and tertiary schooling. Hence, it is 
conceived as the combined knowledge acquired during the three levels of education.  
 In light of the above narrative and perception, we use the principal component analysis 
(PCA) to measure this combined knowledge acquired. The PCA is a widely employed statistical 
technique that is used to reduce a set of highly correlated variables into a set of uncorrelated 
series that represent a significant proportion of the initial variability or information. The criterion 
used to decide which information to retain is from Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002) who have 
recommended stopping at principal components (PCs) that have an eigenvalue of more than one 
(greater than the mean). As shown in Table 1 below, the first PC has an eigenvalue of 1.955 and 
accounts for more than 65% of combined information or variability in the three educational 
levels. Therefore Educatex is the lifelong learning indicator used in this study.  
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Table 1: Principal Component Analysis for educational index (Educatex)  
       
 Component Loadings  Cumulative   
     
 PSE SSE TSE Proportion  Proportion  Eigen value  
First PC 0.443 0.659 0.607 0.651 0.651 1.955 
Second PC 0.868 -0.147 -0.474 0.267 0.918 0.801 
Third PC  -0.223 0.737 -0.638 0.081 1.000 0.243 
       
PC: Principal Component. PSE: Primary School Enrolment. SSE: Secondary School Enrolment. TSE: Tertiary 
School Enrolment.  
 
 
2.2.2 Estimation technique 
 
 We adopt a Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) as the estimation strategy for three 
main reasons: first, it controls for endogeneity in all the regressors, second, cross-country 
variations are not eliminated in the process and third, it reduces biases in the difference 
estimators resulting from small samples. Therefore, it is specifically for this third point that we 
have acted in accordance with Bond et al. (2001, pp. 3-4) in preferring the system GMM 
estimation approach (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) to the difference 
estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991). The two-step procedure is preferred to the one-step because 
it controls for heteroscedasticity. The latter is homoscedasticity consistent. In order to assess the 
validity of the instruments, we perform two tests, notably the Sargan over-identifying restrictions 
(OIR) test for instrument validity and the Arellano & Bond autocorrelation (AR [2]) test for the 
absence of serial correlation in the residuals. As already highlighted in the data section, we also 
control for the unobserved heterogeneity in terms of time fixed-effects. Moreover, short-run or 
business cycle disturbances are mitigated with the employment of three-year non-overlapping 
intervals (NOI). In essence, by employing data averages, we reinforce the primary condition for 
the use of the GMM technique N>T (53>5). Hence, we consistently ensure that the instruments 
are less than the number of cross-sections to restrict over-identification and mitigate instrument 
proliferation concerns.  
 We present the GMM equations in level and first difference below:  
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 Where:‘t’ represents the period and ‘i’ stands for a country. PS  is Political Stability; 
PSE , Primary School Enrolment; SSE , Secondary School Enrolment; TSE , Tertiary School 
Enrolment; Educatex , lifelong learning; X is the set of control variables (trade openness, foreign 
aid, government expenditure, inflation, democracy and GDP per capita growth); i is a country-
specific effect;  t  is a time-specific constant and  ti ,  is an error term. The estimation process 
consists of jointly estimating the regression in levels (Eq. [1]) with that in first-difference (Eq. 
[2]), thereby exploiting all the orthogonality or parallel conditions between the lagged 
endogenous variable and the error term.  
 
3. Empirical Analysis  
3.1 Presentation of Results  
 This section assesses four main issues: (i) the effect of education, per se, (ii) the 
incremental impact of education, (iii) lifelong learning outcomes and (iv) a synergy or interaction 
effect. The results are presented in Table 2 below. Consistent with the information criteria 
highlighted above, the models are valid. Accordingly, the null hypotheses of the Sargan OIR and 
AR (2) tests for the validity of the instruments and absence of autocorrelation respectively are not 
rejected.  
 In the light of the concerns under investigation, the following are established. First, but 
for primary school education, the other educational measures significantly positively affect 
political stability and/or non-violence. The insignificance of primary school enrolment is 
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consistent with the predictions that the know-how achieved at that low level of education is too 
basic to exert any substantial influence on the institutional characteristics of a country. Second, 
there is an incremental effect of education on the dependent variable. Accordingly, the ability to 
participate in a stable political system (and/or engage in non-violent processes) increases in the 
transition from secondary to tertiary education. Third, lifelong learning significantly positively 
affects the constancy of political arrangements in our sample of African countries. Fourth, there 
is evidence of an educational synergy effect since the coefficient on the lifelong learning variable 
is higher than the combined independent impacts of primary, secondary and tertiary enrolments.  
 The significant control variables have the expected signs. Globalization in terms of trade 
openness and democracy improves the political conditions in the African Continent. Foreign aid 
may positively influence political outcomes in the short-run by compensating warring factions for 
the foregone potential gains from engaging in conflicts.    
 
Table 2: The effect of educational dynamics on political stability/non-violence   
         
                                                                 Panel A: Effect of Primary and Secondary School Enrolments  
 Effect of Primary School Enrolment  Effect of Secondary  School Enrolment 
         
Political Stability  (-1) 0.839*** 0.929*** 0.946*** 0.947*** 0.360 0.477 0.673* 0.606 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.162) (0.133) (0.095) (0.175) 
Constant  -0.338 -0.274 -0.172 -0.200 -0.972** -0.704 -0.572 -0.649 
 (0.365) (0.221) (0.509) (0.454) (0.014) (0.273) (0.331) (0.320) 
Primary School Enrolment 0.001 0.001 0.0007 0.0009 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.613) (0.384) (0.655) (0.594)     
Secondary School Enrolment  --- --- --- --- 0.010*** 0.009* 0.005** 0.005** 
     (0.001) (0.063) (0.027) (0.025) 
Trade Openness  0.001 0.0008 0.0005 0.0006 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 (0.324) (0.426) (0.607) (0.553) (0.161) (0.539) (0.678) (0.596) 
Foreign Aid 0.005 0.006* 0.003 0.004 0.011 0.016 0.010 0.011 
 (0.146) (0.054) (0.443) (0.316) (0.124) (0.499) (0.131) (0.170) 
Government Expenditure  0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 -0.003 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.540) (0.664) (0.636) (0.555) (0.567) (0.357) (0.549) (0.503) 
Inflation  --- -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 --- -0.001* -0.0008 -0.001 
  (0.485) (0.671 (0.626)  (0.093) (0.333) (0.265) 
Democracy  --- --- 0.015 0.015 --- --- 0.048 0.054 
   (0.340) (0.201)   (0.312) (0.278) 
GDP per capita growth --- --- --- -0.004 --- --- --- -0.012 
    (0.723)    (0.431) 
         
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.766) (0.619) (0.798) (0.823) (0.199) (0.125) (0.663) (0.925) 
Sargan OIR (0.384) (0.460) (0.408) (0.423) (0.650) (0.443) (0.169) (0.180) 
Wald  (joint) 262.73*** 1981.33*** 1272.18*** 1389.3*** 75.074*** 687.94*** 578.02*** 628.21*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Instruments  17 18 19 20 17 18 19 20 
Countries 36 34 32 32 34 32 30 30 
Observations  125 117 109 109 110 102 94 94 
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                                                 Panel B: Effects of Tertiary School Enrolment and Lifelong Learning 
 Effect of  Tertiary School Enrolment  Effect of Lifelong Learning 
   
Political Stability  (-1) 0.834*** 1.052*** 0.650 0.629 0.067 0.623*** 0.644*** 0.651*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.111) (0.128) (0.878) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Constant  -0.315 -0.153 -0.600* -0.606* -0.650 -0.350** -0.387** -0.372** 
 (0.137) (0.440) (0.099) (0.087) (0.148) (0.042) (0.006) (0.018) 
Tertiary School Enrolment 0.010 0.006 0.014** 0.014** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.136) (0.146) (0.025) (0.026)     
Life Long Learning (Educatex)   --- --- --- --- 0.246** 0.124** 0.114** 0.122** 
     (0.028) (0.038) (0.036) (0.033) 
Trade Openness  0.0009 -0.0001 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.002** 0.002* 0.002* 
 (0.663) (0.907) (0.314) (0.295) (0.162) (0.045) (0.059) (0.062) 
Foreign Aid  0.007 0.005 0.012 0.012 0.021 0.019** 0.017* 0.018* 
 (0.384) (0.483) (0.147) (0.157) (0.162) (0.037) (0.079) (0.065) 
Government Expenditure  0.004 0.002 0.001 0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0009 
 (0.545) (0.596) (0.852) (0.866) (0.946) (0.928) (0.903) (0.887) 
Inflation  --- 0.004 -0.009 -0.009 --- -0.007 -0.020** -0.020** 
  (0.524) (0.439) (0.431)  (0.545) (0.033) (0.037) 
Democracy  --- --- 0.044 0.045 --- --- 0.040** 0.038** 
   (0.215) (0.203)   (0.022) (0.047) 
GDP per capita growth --- --- --- -0.009 --- --- --- -0.013 
    (0.622)    (0.111) 
         
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.788) (0.420) (0.483) (0.494) (0.401) (0.491) (0.332) (0.355) 
Sargan OIR (0.238) (0.215) (0.136) (0.149) (0.797) (0.601) (0.369) (0.440) 
Wald  (joint) 66.366*** 148.06*** 79.124*** 80.776*** 14.491** 208.58*** 97.432*** 163.56*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Instruments  17 18 19 20 18 18 19 20 
Countries 30 28 26 26 25 25 23 23 
Observations  98 92 86 86 77 77 71 71 
         
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The dependent variable is the political stability 
indicator. AR(2) is a Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions test. The significance of bold values is 
twofold. (1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics and (2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: 
(a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and (b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test.  P-values are in brackets. 
GDP is Gross Domestic Product.  
 
 
3. 2 Sensitivity Analysis  
 
 For robustness purposes we perform a sensitivity analysis with the political governance 
indicator as the new dependent variable. Consistent with Kaufmann et al. (2010) as applied by 
Andrés et al. (2014), political governance constitutes voice and accountability and political 
stability/non-violence. The intuition for using political governance for robustness purposes is that 
the absence of voice and accountability is also a cause of conflicts in the African Continent. 
Political governance is measured as the first PC of the two constituent variables. As shown in 
Table 3, the criterion used to retain the first PC is consistent with the justifications from Kaiser 
(1974) and Jolliffe (2002) discussed in Section 2.2.1 for the lifelong learning indicator 
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(Educatex). Hence Polgov is the PCA generated political governance indicator used in the 
robustness test.  
Table 3: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for the Political Governance Index (Polgov) 
      
Principal  Component Matrix (Loadings) Proportion(s) Cumulative  Eigen Value(s)  
Components     Proportion(s)  
 PS VA    
First P.C 0.707 0.707 0.829 0.829 1.659 
Second P.C 0.707 -0.707 0.170 1.000 0.340 
      
P.C: Principal Component. VA: Voice & Accountability. PS: Political Stability.  
 
 
 Table 4 below is a reflection of Table 2 with the political governance dependent variable. 
The models are overwhelming valid because the null hypotheses of the Sargan OIR and AR (2) 
tests are not strongly rejected. The four main concerns underpinning the motivation of the study 
are assessed. The findings in terms of educational attainment, lifelong learning and control 
variables are broadly consistent with those in Table 2.  
 
 
Table 4: The effect educational dynamics on political governance    
         
                                                                   Panel A: Effect of Primary and Secondary School Enrolments 
 Effect of Primary School Enrolment  Effect of Secondary  School Enrolment 
         
Political Governance  (-1) 1.047*** 1.112*** 0.751** 0.780** 0.794*** 0.821*** 0.803*** 0.801*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.034) (0.035) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  -0.363 -0.201 -0.284 -0.297 -0.348 -0.192 -0.364* -0.365* 
 (0.221) (0.570) (0.489) (0.430) (0.122) (0.285) (0.090) (0.089) 
Primary School Enrolment 0.001 0.0003 0.001 0.001 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.525) (0.913) (0.610) (0.587)     
Secondary School Enrolment  --- --- --- --- 0.007 0.006 0.004* 0.004* 
     (0.231) (0.112) (0.083) (0.084) 
Trade Openness  0.0004 0.0003 0.001 0.0009 0.0002 -0.0006 0.0004 0.0004 
 (0.576) (0.765) (0.506) (0.534) (0.883) (0.657) (0.743) (0.741) 
Foreign Aid 0.008*** 0.010** 0.006* 0.006* 0.009* 0.006 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (0.007) (0.015) (0.069) (0.061) (0.078) (0.455) (0.000) (0.000) 
Government Expenditure  0.005 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.004 0.000 0.000 
 (0.174) (0.259) (0.880) (0.835) (0.994) (0.532) (0.997) (0.997) 
Inflation  --- 0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0004 --- -0.001 -0.0002 -0.0002 
  (0.347) (0.350) (0.677)  (0.192) (0.705) (0.747) 
Democracy  --- --- 0.057 0.051 --- --- 0.051* 0.052* 
   (0.438) (0.498)   (0.086) (0.087) 
GDP per capita growth --- --- --- 0.011 --- --- --- -0.0003 
    (0.562)    (0.982) 
         
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.965) (0.754) (0.732) (0.709) (0.395) (0.546) (0.754) (0.750) 
Sargan OIR (0.405) (0.475) (0.546) (0.522) (0.269) (0.402) (0.345) (0.345) 
Wald  (joint) 739.27*** 1280.17*** 1455.49*** 1638.8*** 181.62*** 661.59*** 1342.0*** 1526.9*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Instruments  17 18 19 20 17 18 19 20 
Countries 36 34 32 32 34 32 30 30 
Observations  125 117 109 109 110 102 94 94 
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                                                Panel B: Effects of Tertiary School Enrolment and Lifelong Learning 
 Effect of  Tertiary School  Enrolment  Effect of Lifelong Learning 
Political Governance  (-1) 0.991*** 0.929*** 0.543** 0.524** 0.586*** 0.680*** 0.607*** 0.631*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.045) (0.033) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  -0.223 -0.334 -0.340* -0.350* 0.243 0.106 -0.070 -0.052 
 (0.201) (0.132) (0.074) (0.052) (0.328) (0.575) (0.613) (0.718) 
Tertiary School Enrolment -0.001 -0.001 0.007 0.007 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.867) (0.900) (0.230) (0.256)     
Life Long Learning(Educatex)   --- --- --- --- 0.071 0.078 0.098** 0.098** 
     (0.491) (0.299) (0.023) (0.047) 
Trade Openness  0.0003 0.001 0.002** 0.002** 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.819) (0.486) (0.019) (0.033) (0.967) (0.972) (0.171) (0.215) 
Foreign Aid  0.003 0.005 0.011 0.011 -0.0007 0.008 0.014 0.014 
 (0.478) (0.516) (0.182) (0.141) (0.961) (0.540) (0.184) (0.236) 
Government Expenditure  0.006 0.004 0.001 0.001 -0.007 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.244) (0.389) (0.789) (0.831) (0.247) (0.499) (0.635) (0.688) 
Inflation  --- 0.020** -0.003 -0.003 --- 0.005 -0.013 -0.012 
  (0.016) (0.793) (0.776)  (0.684) (0.333) (0.442) 
Democracy  --- --- 0.082* 0.084** --- --- 0.075** 0.071** 
   (0.063) (0.031)   (0.019) (0.040) 
GDP per capita growth --- --- --- 0.008 --- --- --- -0.012 
    (0.708)    (0.182) 
         
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.319) (0.347) (0.824) (0.610) (0.164) (0.237) (0.334) (0.451) 
Sargan OIR (0.303) (0.543) (0.489) (0.517) (0.915) (0.710) (0.630) (0.658) 
Wald  (joint) 205.16*** 430.84*** 364.45*** 386.28*** 13.726** 52.266*** 190.07*** 310.75*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Instruments  17 18 19 20 17 18 19 20 
Countries 30 28 26 26 27 25 23 23 
Observations  98 92 86 86 83 77 71 71 
         
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The dependent variable is the political governance 
indicator. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions test. The significance of bold values is 
twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics and( 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: 
a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-values in brackets. GDP is 
Gross Domestic Product.  
 
 
4. Further discussion, implications and concluding remarks  
 
 The positive effect of education on political stability is broadly in accordance with the 
theoretical underpinnings discussed above. Indeed, this positive nexus can be attributed among 
other things to the following educational channels: social responsibility, improved social 
cohesion and regulatory compliance and better legal structures (Beets, 2005; Heyneman, 2002, 
2008a; Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2009). The positive impact of education on political stability 
could be traceable to the non-cognitive and cognitive appeals of education. Consistent with this 
interpretation is the inference that education endows students with the patience to sacrifice the 
present for more rewarding gains in the future. This may be primarily because they have to work 
hard in order to get pass grades (Kaffenberger, 2012). Moreover, a student that has sacrificed 
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many years in studies may have other means of making ends meet than resorting to violence. This 
explanation is derived from an evaluation of the risks and returns involved in criminal activities.   
 On the other hand, the findings are inconsistent with the branch of the literature which 
maintains that education worsens political governance processes (Kaffenberger, 2012; Mocan, 
2008; Truex, 2011). However, the element of consolation in this second stream is the recognition 
that, despite the established doctrine the role of education remains fundamental in improving 
governance if good policies are to be put in place and appropriately enforced (Truex, 2011).  
 The results on the incremental impact of schooling is in line with Cheung and Chan 
(2008) and Lederman et al. (2005) who concluded that higher levels of education are associated 
with improvement in the indicators of political governance. The findings indicate that policy 
actions to drive-up standards in the formal education sector would enhance the opportunity for 
building better political governance institutions and a stable government. Two specific 
implications arise. First, with regard to the incremental benefits of educational attainment, 
guidelines which encourage a smooth transition from primary to tertiary levels would 
significantly benefit the overall economy through a greater stability in political outcomes.  
Second, with respect to the synergy impact, the drive towards a knowledge economy by means of 
formal lifelong learning will be beneficial to society mostly in terms of reduced political strife 
and social unrest. 
 Improving human capital externalities by means of educational role models could also 
accelerate the political benefits of lifelong learning. Indeed, recent evidence has shown that such 
externalities are considerably relevant in Africa’s transformation into a knowledge economy 
(Wantchekon et al., 2014). Hence, policy initiatives to provide educational inducements would be 
vital in those African countries, such as Burundi, Liberia, Rwanda, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Congo 
Democratic Republic and Angola, with high risks of political insurrection and civil unrest. Local 
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or indigenous communities with histories of recurrent tribal wars and conflicts should also be 
targeted by educational officials. Cooperation for knowledge dissemination at the national and 
local levels is also highly desirable especially in relation to peace education.  
 Whereas there is some consensus that the negative impact of a brain drain could be 
countered with remittances (Ngoma & Ismail, 2013; Osabuohien and Efobi, 2013), Nyarko and 
Gyimah-Brempong (2011) have concluded that education is the more important tool for social 
protection in the long-run. We may infer that the educated abroad have some leverage in 
transferring knowledge to home universities with a consequent impact on the political situation of 
these home countries. This recommendation concurs with the conclusions of Wantchekon et al. 
(2014) on human capital externalities from education. Hence, measures which are put in place by 
governments to encourage the home-coming of their educated nationals could be correlated with 
an enabling environment for better political governance and social cohesion.  
 In summary, in order to maximize the benefits of education in conflict management and 
prevention, two factors are essential. First, bold steps are imperative to increase the rates of 
enrolment and quality of teaching in schools, colleges and universities. The most obvious of these 
initiatives would appear to be free education at every level if such can be afforded. Then too, free 
school meals, allowances for school uniform, awards for good teachings and so on should all 
enhance the impact of education on political stability. The formation of this human capital factor 
is critical for enhancing the return to money allocated to conflict prevention studies, science and 
technological development. Second, after university graduation, people should be encouraged to 
continue with further education and training in order to adapt their skills to a changing work 
environment. Tax reduction to pay for staff development, for example, may be a worthwhile 
policy action. Indeed, the productivity gains therefrom should positively affect economic output 
and the employment rate. This last is a critical factor for social cohesion.  
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 In conclusion, we should note that the role of education in the fight against conflict and 
violence has remained widely debated in policy and academic circles. Against the background of 
worsening political instability in Africa and the central role of the knowledge economy in 21
st
 
century development, this paper has provided three contributions to the existing literature. It has 
assessed: the incremental, the lifelong learning and the synergy effects of educational attainment. 
We have defined lifelong learning as the combined knowledge acquired during primary, 
secondary and tertiary educations. Three findings have been established. First, education is an 
effective weapon in the fight against political insurgency. Second, there is an incremental effect 
of education arising from a smooth transition of pupils from secondary to tertiary schools. Third, 
lifelong learning also has positive and interactive effects, meaning that the incidence of 
continuing to further education after graduation enhances the combined independent effects of 
various education levels. The empirical evidence is based on 53 African countries for the period 
1996-2010. Policy implications have also been discussed.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Definitions of variables 
   
Variable(s) Definition(s) Source(s) 
   
Political Stability/ No 
violence   
Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as the 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and 
violent means, including domestic violence and 
terrorism. 
World Bank (WDI)  
   
Voice & Accountability Voice and Accountability (estimate): Measures the 
extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government and to enjoy 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free 
media. 
World Bank (WDI) 
   
Political Governance First Principal Component of Political Stability and 
Voice & Accountability 
PCA 
   
Primary Schooling (PS) Primary School Enrolment (% of Gross) World Bank (WDI)  
   
Secondary Schooling (SS) Secondary School Enrolment (% of Gross) World Bank (WDI)  
   
Tertiary Schooling (TS)  Tertiary  School Enrolment (% of Gross) World Bank (WDI) 
   
Educational index  First principal component of PS, SS & TS PCA 
   
Government Expenditure  Government Final Expenditure (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI)  
   
Trade Openness  Exports plus Imports of Commodities (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
   
GDP per capita growth  Gross Domestic Product per capita growth rate (annual 
%) 
World Bank (WDI) 
   
Inflation  Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
   
Foreign Aid (NODA) Net Official Development Assistance (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI)  
   
Democracy  Institutionalized Democracy (Estimate) World Bank (WDI) 
   
   
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. PCA: Principal Component Analysis.  
NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Summary Statistics  
      
 Mean S.D Min Max Obs. 
      
Political Stability  -0.571 0.952 -3.229 1.143 265 
Voice & Accountability  -0.679 0.730 -2.161 1.047 265 
Political Governance (Polgov) -0.016 1.291 -3.204 2.621 264 
Primary School Enrolment 94.414 25.647 28.298 149.70 237 
Secondary School Enrolment  38.683 26.489 5.372 115.03 199 
Tertiary School Enrolment  6.228 8.489 0.241 53.867 183 
Educational index (Lifelong learning) -0.070 1.327 -2.103 5.527 152 
Government Expenditure  4.495 8.064 -17.387 49.275 164 
Trade Openness  78.340 39.979 20.980 250.95 247 
GDP per capita growth rate  2.320 5.016 -11.248 38.258 257 
Inflation  56.191 575.70 -45.335 8603.3 230 
Foreign Aid (NODA) 10.889 12.029 0.015 102.97 253 
Democracy   2.373 3.871 -8.000 10.000 250 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations.  
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Appendix 3: Correlation Analysis  
              
Demo NODA Inflation GDPpcg Trade Gov.Ex PSE SSE TSE Lifelong PolSta VA Polgov  
1.000 -0.001 -0.058 0.036 0.005 0.051 0.229 0.291 -0.044 0.148 0.551 0.785 0.738 Demo 
 1.000 -0.023 0.032 -0.083 0.078 -0.055 -0.488 -0.454 -0.456 -0.105 0.028 -0.040 NODA 
  1.000 -0.105 0.024 -0.243 -0.064 -0.100 -0.081 -0.106 -0.098 -0.109 -0.114 Inflation 
   1.000 0.245 0.245 0.149 0.058 0.047 0.115 0.071 0.008 0.043 GDPpcg 
    1.000 -0.070 0.261 0.389 0.057 0.283 0.321 0.052 0.202 Trade 
     1.000 0.019 0.013 0.092 0.087 -0.037 -0.037 -0.040 Gov. Ex 
      1.000 0.452 0.257 0.635 0.294 0.251 0.299 PSE 
       1.000 0.725 0.919 0.435 0.362 0.436 SSE 
        1.000 0.843 0.081 -0.075 0.002 TSE 
         1.000 0.299 0.196 0.268 Lifelong 
          1.000 0.682 0.917 PolSta 
           1.000 0.917 VA 
            1.000 Polgov 
              
Demo: Democracy. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. Gov. Ex: Government 
Expenditure. PSE: Primary School Enrolment. SSE: Secondary School Enrolment. TSE: Tertiary School Enrolment. Lifelong: 
Lifelong Learning (Education index). PolSta: Political Stability. VA: Voice & Accountability. Polgov: Political Governance.  
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